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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20001054-CA 
vs. 
DANIEL B. POWELL, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of attempted witness tampering, a class 
A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-508 (2000), in the Second 
Judicial District, Davis County, the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, does this Court 
have jurisdiction to address his claim that the plea did not strictly comply with rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
1 
Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law reviewed for correctness See 
State v Martin, 1999 UT App 62,«[ 7, 976 P 2d 1224 
2 Did the trial court plainly err when it informed defendant of his rule 11 
rights by reference to its recitation of those rights in the proceeding that 
immediately preceded defendant's plea-taking? 
To establish plain error, defendant must demonstrate three elements: (i) an 
error occurred; (n) the error was obvious; and (m) the error was harmful. State v 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) If any one of these elements is missing, 
plain error does not exist. Id. at 1209. 
3. Did the tnal court plainly err by sentencing defendant without expressly 
requesting input from the substitute prosecutor present at sentencing, where defense 
counsel recounted his negotiations with the assigned prosecutor and their mutual 
agreement to recommend concurrent terms? 
See standard of review for issue 2. 
4. Did the trial court plainly err by sentencing defendant without making any 
express reference to the contents of the presentence investigation report (PSI)9 
See standard of review for issue 2. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
included in Addendum A: 
2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(4) (1999); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-508 (2000); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1994); 
UtahR. Crim. P. 11(e)(3); and 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with retaliation against a witness or 
informant, a third degree felony. R. 4. The charge was based on threats defendant 
made, following convictions on weapon and drug counts, against a highway patrol 
officer who had testified at his trial. See PSI at 2-3. Defendant pled guilty to 
attempted witness tampering, a class A misdemeanor. R. 20. 
When defendant indicated his desire to plead guilty at the pretrial conference, 
the district court explained the charges against him. R. 70: Tab2, at 1. The court, 
noting that defendant had been present for the immediately preceding case, where 
David Allen Bradshaw had entered a guilty plea, asked defendant whether he had 
heard the rights that the court had explained to Mr. Bradshaw.1 Id. at 1-2. 
Defendant answered that he had. Id. at 2. The court then asked defendant whether 
he understood those rights. Id. The court further asked, "You understand they 
apply to you just as they did to Mr. Bradshaw?" Id. "You understand that if you 
enter a plea of guilty to this amended charge that you will be giving up those 
'The transcript of the change of plea hearing for David Allen Bradshaw is included 
in the record. R. 72. Defendant does not allege that the trial court failed to comply with 
the requirements of rule 11 in Mr. Bradshaw's case. Rather, he challenges the procedure 
whereby the court referred back to its recitation of a defendant's rights in that case. 
3 
rights?" Id. "You understand if you plead guilty there will be no trial and no 
witnesses will be called and that you'll be relieving the prosecution of proving this 
attempted retaliation against a witness or informant because you will be admitting 
that charge. Do you understand those things?" Id. At every juncture, defendant 
responded affirmatively. Id. 
The court next explained how a guilty plea would limit defendant's appeal 
rights and delineated the elements of the offense that the State would have to prove 
"beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously to a jury." Id. at 2-3. The court then 
asked defendant why he was pleading guilty. Id. at 3. Defendant explained that he 
had changed his plea to take advantage of the plea bargain. Id. He observed that 
no one had promised him a particular sentence, but "[t]hey ha[d] just suggested that 
it would run concurrent with my other charges." Id. at 4. Defense counsel also 
stated that the prosecutor had represented that "he would recommend concurrent on 
this case with the sentence to be imposed on the other case." Id. The court 
explained first to defendant and then to defense counsel that such a 
recommendation was not binding on the court. Id. 
The court subsequently asked the prosecutor and defense counsel for the facts 
that would support the guilty plea. Id. at 5-6. Based on their responses, the court 
found that the facts would support a guilty plea and asked defendant whether, 
4 
having had his rights explained to him, he still desired to enter a guilty plea. Id. at 
6. Defendant said that he did. Id. 
The court then accepted the plea and informed defendant that he would have 
thirty days in which to move for withdrawal of the plea, noting that he would have 
to show "good cause" to succeed on a motion. Id. at 7. The court also ordered 
preparation of a PSI. Id. 
The PSI was prepared, but before the court could conduct a sentencing hearing 
defense counsel was contacted by a United States probation officer in Wyoming, 
who informed him that defendant had been arrested and was facing two charges, 
one for being a felon in possession of twenty-four weapons and another for 
possession of a machine gun. R. 70: Tab 3, at 1. The officer did not anticipate that 
defendant would be released from federal custody "anytime soon." Id. 
Defendant thereafter, while in custody at a federal penitentiary in 
Pennsylvania, executed a consent to sentencing in absentia. R. 41-42. He desired 
that his sentence be imposed, apparently hoping that it would run concurrently with 
the federal term he was then serving.2 R. 70: Tab 4, at 1. Defense counsel noted 
that defendant's earliest release from federal custody would be in 2004. Id. 
2In his pro se notice of intent to appeal, defendant stressed that he wanted his 
sentence to continue to run while his appeal was pending and that he did not want a stay. 
R. 49. 
5 
When sentencing was held, defense counsel and a substitute prosecutor, Judith 
West, were present. R. 70: Tab 4, at unpaginated cover sheet. Defense counsel 
explained his earlier conversations with William McGuire, who had represented the 
State in proceedings to that point. Id. at 1. Defense counsel indicated that Mr. 
McGuire was willing to "allow [the sentence] to run concurrently]." Id. Defense 
counsel then stated, "I would ask for sentencing today and allow it to run 
[concurrently] with his federal commitment in Pennsylvania." Id. The substitute 
prosecutor made no additional comment. Id. 
The trial court then sentenced defendant on convictions in the earlier related 
case—to a prison term of zero to five years for possession of a dangerous weapon 
and to six-month jail terms for each of two misdemeanor drug counts, all sentences 
to run concurrently. R. 70: Tab 4, at 2-3. In this case, he sentenced defendant to a 
one-year jail term for witness tampering and ordered that it be served following the 
dangerous weapon sentence. Id. at 3. He further ordered, however, that all 
sentences run concurrently with the sentence defendant was then serving for his 
federal offenses. Id. 
Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant timely 
appealed. R. 48. 
6 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
No trial was held. This statement of the facts therefore reflects the crime as 
detailed in the "Official Version of the Offense" in the PSI. See PSI at 2-3. 
Defendant was charged in a related case with possession of a dangerous 
weapon, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance. 
See PSI at 8. Trial was held on March 19, 1999, and defendant was convicted. Id. 
at 2-3, 8. 
As defendant left the trial with his attorney, he met the investigating officer, 
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Douglas Anderson, who had testified at trial. Id. at 
2; see also R. 70: Tab 2, at 6. Defendant's attorney heard defendant tell Trooper 
Anderson, "I'm going to meet you again." PSI at 2. Defendant's attorney 
instructed defendant not to say anything more; but as Trooper Anderson was 
walking away, defendant yelled out, "I'm going to see you again on a dark night. 
You can count on it, it's going to happen." Id. at 3. The incident resulted in 
defendant's conviction in this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea. This court therefore 
lacks jurisdiction to review defendant's claim that the trial court failed to comply 
strictly with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In any event, defendant's 
claim fails on the merits. The trial court properly established that defendant was 
7 
adequately informed of all the rights enumerated in rule 11 when the trial court 
detailed them in a change of plea proceeding immediately preceding defendant's 
plea-taking. 
Defendant has demonstrated no error at sentencing. The trial court complied 
with rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, when it received a joint defense-
prosecution sentencing recommendation. If error occurred, it was neither obvious 
or harmful. 
Further, the trial court did not violate defendant's due process rights when 
fixing his sentence. The sentence was based on reliable and relevant information. 
The court is required to consider enumerated factors relevant to consecutive 
sentencing, but it is not required to reference the PSI or to otherwise detail the 
analysis it used in arriving at its sentence. Further, the trial court did, in fact, 




THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR DEFENDANTS 
CHALLENGE TO HIS GUILTY PLEA 
Defendant argues that "[t]he trial court committed plain error by failing to 
strictly comply with the requirements of rule 11 in the course of taking 
8 
[defendant's] guilty plea." Br. Aplt. at 13. This Court has no jurisdiction to hear 
this claim. 
Utah law requires a defendant to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea within 
thirty days after the entry of the plea. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1994). 
"[F]ailure to do so extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the 
guilty plea on appeal." State v. Reyes, 2002 UT.13, U 3, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 28. 
Because defendant did not make a timely motion to withdraw, this Court "lack[s] 
jurisdiction to address the issue on appeal." Id. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AT THE PLEA-TAKING 
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it referred defendant to 
its recitation of a defendant's rule 11 rights in the change of plea proceeding 
immediately preceding defendant's plea-taking. Br. Aplt. at 17-18. Defendant also 
claims that the trial court plainly erred by failing to establish a factual basis for his 
plea. Id. at 19-20. In order to demonstrate plain error, a defendant must 
demonstrate that (i) an error occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the error 
was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
This Court may review defendant's claim only if it determines that it has 
jurisdiction. See Point I, above. In any event, defendant has not demonstrated 
error. Alternatively, if error occurred, it was neither obvious nor harmful. 
9 
A. No error occurred. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states that a court may not accept 
a guilty plea until the court has found that 
the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public 
trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in 
open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance 
of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3). A trial court "bear[s] the burden of ensuring compliance 
with this rule" and must "establish that defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and 
voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or 
her constitutional rights." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,1 i 1, 22 P.3d 1242 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). While the trial court had a duty of "strict 
compliance," "[s]trict compliance . . . does not mandate a particular script or rote 
recitation of the rights listed." Id. The "substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that 
defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of 
their decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or 
undermined by formalistic ritual." Id. 
The findings required by rule 11 "may be based on questioning of the 
defendant on the record" or by use of "an affidavit reciting [the rule 11] factors." 
Id. at K 12 (citing rule 11(e)(8)). While this rule "describes the fundamental bases 
for the court's findings of knowing waiver—direct questioning or an affidavit—the 
10 
rule is stated permissively and thus does not prevent a court from taking into 
account other record factors in making its findings." Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held, in fact, "that strict compliance can be accomplished by multiple means, 
including the content of other documents such as the information, presentence 
reports, exhibits, etc., as long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long 
as the record reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled/' Id. (citing State v. 
Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991) (quotation marks omitted)); see also State 
v. Willetu 842 P.2d 860, 862-63 (Utah 1992) (permitting reference to preliminary 
hearing to establish compliance with rule 11). 
The record in this case demonstrates that the court rehearsed every requirement 
of the rule to David Bradshaw, the defendant appearing in the case immediately 
preceding defendant's. See R. 72:4-5. When defendant indicated his desire to enter 
a guilty plea, the court asked defendant whether he had heard and understood the 
rights detailed in connection with Bradshaw's guilty plea. R. 70: Tab 2, at 2. 
Defendant answered that he did. Id, This procedure "ensure[d] that defendant[] 
kn[e]w of [his] rights and thereby underst[oo]d the basic consequences of [his] 
decision to plead guilty." Visser, 2000 UT 88, at f 11. The procedure, in fact, 
provided clearer and more immediate certainty that defendant knew of his rights 
than detailing those rights in the information or the PSI—a permissible 
alternative—might have provided. 
11 
Defendant also alleges that the tnal court violated rule 11 by failing to 
determine that there was "sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction." Br. Aplt. at 19. Defendant fails to cite relevant portions of the record 
showing that the trial court did, indeed, make this determination. 
Rule 11 requires that a trial court determine that "there is a factual basis for [a 
guilty] plea." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). "A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if 
the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction." Id. 
Before accepting defendant's plea, the trial court asked the prosecutor for "the 
facts that would support a guilty plea," R. 70: Tab 2, at 5. The prosecutor 
explained that defendant had been tried before the court on March 19, 1999. Id. at 
6. "During the trial an officer testified. After the trial was over the defendant came 
in contact with the officer outside the courtroom and told the officer that he would 
see him again on some dark night." Id. The prosecutor further explained that. 
"[t]he demeanor of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the statement 
[led] the officer to believe that it was a threat against him." Id. 
The trial court then asked defense counsel for his views. Defense counsel 
indicated that defendant admitted making the statement but, should he go to trial, 
would attempt to argue that the statement was not a threat. Id. 
12 
Based on this information, the court found that "those facts would support a 
plea of guilty." Id. The court thus properly concluded that the prosecution had 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction, as required by rule 
11. See State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 674 (Utah App. 1993) ("While the record as 
a whole need not be conclusive or uncontroverted on the question of guilt, there 
must be evidence from which a court could reasonably find that the defendant was 
guilty—a factual basis for the plea.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
B. Error, if any, was not obvious. 
The trial court did not err in the means it employed to inform defendant of his 
rights or in any other aspect of its rule 11 colloquy. Assuming arguendo that error 
did occur, it was not obvious. "Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's 
error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." 
State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Ross, 951 
P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997)). Defendant cites no "settled appellate law" that 
would suggest that a trial court must formally reiterate a defendant's rule 11 rights 
during his plea hearing if the trial court establishes that a defendant has been 
informed of those rights. Rather, the trial court's procedure was analogous to the 
clearly permissible use of an affidavit reciting a defendant's rights and included 
questions establishing that defendant had both heard and understood the rights. 
Finally, no settled appellate precedent suggests that the trial court used any 
13 
improper procedure to determine that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction. 
C. Error, if any, was not harmful. 
To establish plain error, defendant must demonstrate that the error was 
harmful. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. While noncompliance with rule 11 may 
establish error and, in some cases, even obvious error, it does not establish 
prejudice. See State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,] 15, 5 P.3d 1222 ("it is 
difficult to see how the court's failure in this case to discuss the possibility that 
defendant may serve no time and incur no fine [as required by rule 11(e)(5)] would 
result in harmful error").3 
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel share a "common standard" of 
prejudice. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92 (citing State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989); State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 
(Utah App. 1994); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992)). A 
defendant claiming that his guilty plea resulted from counsel's ineffectiveness must 
show "'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
3A "knowing and voluntary" guilty plea does not require strict compliance with 
rule 11 to be constitutionally sound under either the federal or state constitution. See 
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991-992 (Utah 1993). "Rule 11 is a device for 
protecting the right [of voluntariness] but the scope of Rule 11 does not equal the more 
limited scope of the constitutional right. Id. at 992 (quotation and citation omitted). 
Instead, compliance with rule 11 merely "creates a presumption that the plea was 
voluntarily entered." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 11, 1 P.3d 1108. 
14 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial/^ Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
Thus, a defendant attempting to show plain error under rule 11 must demonstrate 
that but for the trial court's omissions, he would not have pled guilty but would 
have insisted on going to trial. Defendant must establish that an obvious error so 
infected the plea-taking that the appellate court no longer has confidence in its 
underlying validity, because the plea was less than knowing and voluntary. Cf. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208; Visser, 2000 UT 88, HI 11-14. 
In other words, where a defendant claims plain error in the taking of his plea, 
the test for prejudice is driven not by the requirements of rule 11, but by traditional 
plain error analysis.4 
Defendant alludes to the prejudice requirement, but does not suggest that, but 
for any alleged rule 11 error, he would not have pled guilty. More significantly, he 
refers to no record evidence showing how the court's alleged errors materially 
affected his decision. Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate harm. 
4This Court strayed from this analysis in Tamawiecki by presuming prejudice, i.e., 
that failure to advise Tamawiecki of her right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury 
"[was] prejudical and therefore harmful." Tamawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,^ 18. 
Tamawiecki should have been required to demonstrate that, but for the trial court's 
violations of rule 11, she would not have pled guilty. Otherwise, omission of the words 
"speedy" and "impartial," like the failure to advise Tamawiecki of her minimum possible 
sentence as required by rule 11(e)(5), would have been harmless. 
15 
in. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SOLICIT FURTHER 
SENTENCING INPUT FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF A JOINT 
DEFENSE-PROSECUTION SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION WAS 
NOT PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred at sentencing, alleging a 
violation of Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Br. Aplt. at 22. 
Defendant argues specifically that the trial court "heard from neither defense 
counsel nor the prosecutor concerning any information in mitigation of punishment 
or any other information material to the imposition of sentence." Id. at 23 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant has not demonstrated, as he must, 
that an error occurred, that it was obvious, and that it was harmful. See Dunn, 850 
P.2dat 1208. 
Rule 22(a) states, in part: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of 
sentence. 
This Court has held that a trial court has "an affirmative obligation . . . to extend 
the opportunity to be heard/' concluding that a trial court errs when it sentences an 
absent defendant without giving that opportunity to defense counsel and to the 
prosecution. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, % 32, 31 P.3d 615, cert, granted, 
Utah Supreme Court order dated February 5, 2002. 
16 
A. No error occurred. 
In this case, no error occurred. Defendant, who had filed a consent to 
sentencing in absentia, was not present. The trial court, however, heard from 
defense counsel, who conveyed a joint recommendation on sentencing he had 
reached with the prosecutor in the case. R. 70: Tab 4, at 1. A substitute prosecutor 
was present at sentencing, but added nothing further to the joint recommendation. 
See R. 70, Tab 4. This proceeding was sufficient to meet the requirements of rule 
22(a), as the joint recommendation constituted input from both defense counsel and 
the prosecution. 
B. Error, if any, was not obvious. 
Even if error occurred, i.e., if the trial court should have requested any 
additional information from either defense counsel or the prosecutor, that error was 
not obvious. Error is not obvious "where there is no settled appellate law to guide 
the trial court." Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. Defendant points to "no settled appellate 
law" that should have put the trial court on notice of an affirmative duty to solicit 
input from defense counsel or the prosecution. Defendant points only to Wanosik, 
2001 UT App 241. Sentencing in this case occurred in October, 2000. R. 70: Tab 
4, at 1. This Court did not file its decision in Wanosik until almost a year later. 
Wanosik could not, therefore, have guided the trial court. 
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C. Error, if any, was not harmful. 
Finally, if error occurred, it was not harmful. Defendant argues that, had the 
court asked the substitute prosecutor, Judith West, for her input, she would likely 
have recommended a "concurrent sentence/' Br. Aplt. at 25. Defendant apparently 
believes that the substitute prosecutor would not only have recommended that 
defendant's state sentences run concurrently with his federal sentence—as 
contemplated by the joint agreement—but also that defendant's state witness 
tampering sentence run concurrently with defendant's other state sentences for 
possession of a dangerous weapon, drug paraphernalia, and a controlled substance. 
Defendant's claim is based on speculation. Defense counsel conveyed to the 
court the joint recommendation to which he and the assigned prosecutor, William 
McGuire, had agreed. R. 70: Tab 4, at 1. The joint recommendation was that 
defendant's state sentences run concurrently with his federal sentence. See id. 
While the agreement differed from Mr. McGuire's earlier recommendation at the 
plea-taking, the recommendation took into account defendant's changed 
circumstances due to his intervening federal conviction and sentence. See R. 70: 
Tab 2, at 4, and Tab 3, at 1. Nothing suggests that the substitute prosecutor, 
standing in for Mr. McGuire on the day of sentencing, would have made a different 
recommendation. Further, nothing suggests that the trial judge would have been 
willing to run defendant's witness tampering sentence concurrently with his other 
state sentences. The trial court explained that "the nature of the [witness 
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tampering] offense" was the determinative factor in his decision to run the witness 
tampering sentence consecutively to defendant's other state sentences. R. 70: Tab 
4, at 3. 
In sum, defendant has not demonstrated plain error. He has not demonstrated 
that the trial court failed to hear from defense counsel and from the prosecution. If 
error occurred, it was not obvious where no settled appellate law mandated an 
affirmative duty to ask either or both defense counsel and the prosecution for 
sentencing input. Finally, if error occurred, it was harmless. Defense counsel and 
the prosecution had agreed to recommend that defendant's sentences on his state 
convictions run concurrently with the sentence on his federal convictions. That was 
done. Nothing suggests that either defense counsel or the prosecution had any 
additional input that he or she wished to offer. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN FIXING 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE 
Defendant alleges that the trial court violated due process in fixing his 
sentence. Br. Aplt. at 22. Defendant apparently believes that the trial court did not 
base the sentence on relevant and reliable information. Id. at 23. Specifically, 
defendant claims that the trial court did not refer to the PSI during the sentencing 
hearing. Id. At 24. He suggests that the trial court therefore did not consider 
mitigating information in the PSI that, he alleges, might have led the court to order 
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that his witness tampering sentence run concurrently with, rather than consecutive 
to, his weapon possession sentence. Id. 
Defendant has inadequately briefed this issue and misread the record. In any 
case, his argument fails on the merits. 
A. Defendant has inadequately briefed this issue. 
Defendant has not adequately briefed this issue. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, requires that arguments in an appellant's brief contain 
"citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." See State v. 
Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, f 95, 20 P.3d 342, cert denied, 122 S.Ct. 522 (2001) ("[A] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority 
cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research."). Defendant cites no authority requiring that a 
trial court reference a PSI at sentencing and does not acknowledge record evidence 
that the trial court did, indeed, refer to the PSI. See R. 70: Tab 4, at 1. Defendant 
has pointed to no unreliable information upon which the trial court relied. This 
Court should therefore decline to address defendant's claim. See State in re A.C.C, 
2002 UT 22, ^ 27 n.7, Utah Adv. Rep. (declining to address claim citing 
no legal authority). 
B. No error occurred. 
Due process requires that a trial court base sentencing on relevant and reliable 
information. State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). Further, when 
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imposing consecutive sentences the trial court must consider "the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(4) (1999). 
There is, however, no statutory or judicial mandate requiring a trial court to 
evidence its analysis of the factors upon which it bases its sentencing decision." 
Specifically, no authority requires either that the trial court refer to the PSI when 
imposing sentence or that it detail its analysis of the consecutive sentence factors 
contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(4). 
Further, Utah appellate cases that have addressed the propriety of consecutive 
sentences seem to indicate that as long as evidence of the factors is on the record, 
the reviewing court will assume that the trial court considered them. See State v. 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^  11, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 ("we will not assume that the 
trial court's silence, by itself, presupposes that the court did not consider the proper 
[sentencing] factors as required by law"); State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 
1978) (stating that it must be presumed that the court used a court-ordered report as 
statute contemplated); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997) 
"The analysis in this section borrows heavily from this Court's memorandum 
decision in State v. Herrera, 2001 UT App 393, 2001 WL 1587273, and portions of the 
section quote directly from that decision. In keeping with rules 30(d) and 31(f), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, because Herrera is unpublished, this brief does not use 
quotation marks and does not cite page references. 
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(affirming consecutive sentences where "defendant [did] not show that the trial 
court failed to consider [statutory] factors"). Information in the PSI is record 
evidence relevant to sentencing factors and, accordingly, the reviewing court may 
assume that the trial court considered the PSI. See People v. Torres, 496 N.E.2d 
1060, 1063-1064 (111. App. 1986) (finding no error in trial court's failure to 
reference PSI and stating "[i]t is well settled that.a trial court is not required to set 
forth on the record the process it uses in reaching its determination of a proper 
sentence, or note for the record every factor that was considered"); State v. Ramsey, 
457 So.2d 211, 216 (La. App. 1984) (affirming defendant's sentence where 
supported by the record and rejecting claim of error based on failure to reference 
mitigating circumstances included in PSI). 
The presumption that the trial court acted properly accords with case law 
requiring an appellant to support an allegation of error with record evidence. 
"Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation 
which the review court has no power to determine." State v. Wulffenstein% 657 P.2d 
289, 293 (Utah 1982). A reviewing court "simply cannot rule on a question which 
depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record." Id. 
The trial court had before it defendant's PSI and, contrary to defendant's 
allegation, did refer to it. R. 70: 4, at 1 (stating that it would impose sentence 
~[b]ased upon the pre-sentence report"). Further, defendant has pointed to no 
record evidence demonstrating that the trial court failed to consider any portion of 
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the PSI. Further, he has pointed to no unreliable or irrelevant information upon 
which sentencing was based. This Court may therefore properly presume that the 
trial court considered the information in the PSI and all other relevant information 
before it. Further, this Court may presume that the trial court considered the 
statutory factors relevant to consecutive sentences. 
C. Error, if any, was not obvious. 
Even if error occurred, it could not have been obvious. "[E]rror is not plain 
where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." Ross, 951 P.2d at 
239. The State is aware of no settled precedent, and defendant cites none, requiring 
a trial court to reference the PSI or its contents at sentencing. 
D. Error, if any, was not harmful. 
Finally, if error occurred, it was not harmful. Having considered all of the 
evidence and all of the statutory factors relevant to sentencing, the trial :ourt 
explained that "the nature of the offense" was the determinative factor in its 
decision to make the witness-tampering sentence consecutive to the sentence in the 
dangerous weapon/paraphernalia/possession case. R. 70: Tab 4, at 3. The trial 
judge concluded that a sentence consecutive to that imposed for earlier offenses was 
appropriate where, following defendant's conviction for those offenses, he 
threatened a witness who had testified against him. See id. Apparently, the trial 
court concluded that a sentence that added nothing for witness-tampering would 
have done little to penalize and/or deter such conduct. 
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Nothing in the PSI would have changed the court's assessment of the nature of 
the witness-tampering offense as a special circumstance requiring a penalty of its 
own, i.e., a consecutive sentence. Failure to more specifically reference the PSI 
was therefore harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations - Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony 
offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state 
offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run 
consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is 
committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds and states on the 
record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences shall run consecutively 
or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason to believe that the later offense 
occurred while the person was imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter an amended order of 
commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstancesof the offenses and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode 
as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed 
may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his 
initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to 
imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court or by 
a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did 
not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive 
sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat 
the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of 
the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is 
considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the 
aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or 
with a sentence presently being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater 
shall be the term to be served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive 
sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit 
the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive 
sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure correctional 
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tacilit} as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or voided, and the person 
is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
Amended by Chapter 275, 1999 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76 03028.ZIP 3.812 Bytes 
Sections in this ChapterjChapters in this Title|All TitlesjLegislatiye Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday. July 12. 2001 
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76-8-508- Tampering with witness - Retaliation against witness or informant - Bribery -
Communicating a threat. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person 
to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by another as a witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing any of the acts 
specified under Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do 
bodily injury to the person, because of any act performed or to be performed by the person in his 
capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 
Amended by Chapter 1, 2000 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_0A061.ZIP 2,369 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this TitlejAU Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, Jury 12, 2001 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/-code/TITLE76/htm/76_0A061 .htm 2/25-02 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. (1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of the court 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be made 
within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Amended by Chapter 16, 1994 General Session 
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Rule l i . Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless 
the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the 
defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and 
mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If 
a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea 
of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant 
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court 
shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not 
accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel 
and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged 
crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to 
admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum 
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what 
agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea: and 
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(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a sworn 
statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, 
and acknowledged the contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been read or translated to the 
defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise 
concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the 
ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or 
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the 
agreement shall be approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by 
the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may 
permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for 
tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea 
agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or 
withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional 
plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from 
the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant 
who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill. in addition to the other requirements of 
this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is 
mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann." 77-16a-103. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
These amendments are intended to reflect current law without any substantive changes. The addition 
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis in section (e)(4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(0, and is in 
accordance with prior case law. E.g. State v. Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). The rule now 
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explicitly recognizes pleas under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L Ed.2d 
162 (1970), and sets forth the factual basis required for those pleas. E.g. Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 
860 (Utah 1992). 
The amendments explicitly recognize that plea affidavits, where used, may properly be incorporated 
into the record when the trial court determines that the defendant has read (or been read) the affidavit, 
understands its contents, and acknowledges the contents. State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991). 
Proper incorporation of plea affidavits can save the court time, eliminate some of the monotony of 
rote recitations of rights waived by pleading guilty, and allow a more focused and probing inquiry 
into the facts of the offense, the relationship of the law to those facts, and whether the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. These benefits are contingent on a careful and considered review 
of the affidavit by the defendant and proper care by the trial court to verify that such a review has 
actually occurred. 
The final paragraph of section (e) clarifies that the trial court may, but need not, advise defendants 
concerning collateral consequences of a guilty plea. The failure to so advise does not affect the 
validity of a plea. State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 
(Utah 1995). 
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Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, 
unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and 
to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may 
likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for 
defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall 
enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. 
Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the 
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it 
with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender 
committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), 
the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
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